POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
They should have an item called the January Sixth and then when you order it it's nothing
Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
A nothing burger
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Piss and vinegar, it tastes awful
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
Carson v. Makin ruling says that the 'nonsectarian' restriction in Maine's tuition assistance program is unconstitutional
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The Right Honorable Sonya Sotomayor wrote:What a difference five years makes. In 2017, I feared that the Court was 'lead[ing] us . . . to a place where separation of church and state is a constitutional slogan, not a constitutional commitment.' Today, the Court leads us to a place where separation of church and state becomes a constitutional violation.
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its an interesting case. i read through most of the majority opinion and dissents.
it seems like based on the espinoza precedent, the outcome for this case was pretty clear. i found this quote from espinoza, cited by roberts, to be particularly compelling:
sotomayors dissent was refreshing because it was short. i thought she raised one interesting point, which maybe was a bit of a directive as to how to narrowly tailor similar legislation in the future. she wrote:
it seems like based on the espinoza precedent, the outcome for this case was pretty clear. i found this quote from espinoza, cited by roberts, to be particularly compelling:
i found breyers originalists arguments in dissent interesting. he wrote:a state need not subsidize private education, but once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.
his attempts to distinguish espinoza as religious charcter vs. religious use seemed a bit disingenuous to me, particularly since he was not in the majority for that case. trinity lutheran (the other main precedent) seemed distinguishable with that logic, but not espinoza.as thomas jefferson, one of the leading drafters and proponents of [the religion clauses] wrote, "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." [citation]. and as james madison, another drafter and proponent, said, compelled taxpayer sponsorship of religion "is itself a signal of persecution," which "will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with religion, has produced amongst its several sects. [citation]. To interepret the clauses with these concerns in mind may help to further their original purpose of avoiding religious-based division.
sotomayors dissent was refreshing because it was short. i thought she raised one interesting point, which maybe was a bit of a directive as to how to narrowly tailor similar legislation in the future. she wrote:
in addition, while purporting to protect against discrimination of one kind, the court requires maine to fund what many of its citizens believe to be discrimination of other kinds. [citation to breyers dissent] (summarizing bangor christian schools and temple academys policies denying enrollment to students based on gender identity, sexual orientation, and religion).
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I'm honestly surprised it got this far, Espinoza seems really cut and dry to me.
Personally I think he's starting from a definition of 'establishment' that is so broad as to be functionally meaningless.seathesee wrote: ↑Tue Jun 21, 2022 4:13 pm his attempts to distinguish espinoza as religious charcter vs. religious use seemed a bit disingenuous to me, particularly since he was not in the majority for that case. trinity lutheran (the other main precedent) seemed distinguishable with that logic, but not espinoza.
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
She thought the separation of church and state meant she could separate churchgoers from state benefitsDantes wrote: ↑Tue Jun 21, 2022 2:49 pm
The Right Honorable Sonya Sotomayor wrote:What a difference five years makes. In 2017, I feared that the Court was 'lead[ing] us . . . to a place where separation of church and state is a constitutional slogan, not a constitutional commitment.' Today, the Court leads us to a place where separation of church and state becomes a constitutional violation.
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
I view Breyer's opinion as: this is the last refuge of the 'play in the joints' jurisprudence. It's hard to imagine a better set of facts (other than Locke itself) for siding with the state. Espinoza is precedent but the 'play in the joints' is also precedent, and if it doesn't come into play now, then when? The majority breezily distinguishes Locke as relying on a historical state interest, but Locke never held that a historical interest was the outer limit of the state's powers, merely that it was sufficient in that case. When the majority confines Locke to such a narrow set of circumstances, it "effectively abandons this longstanding doctrine". The religious character vs. religious use may be a small step, but it could also be said that the religious education of children is a small step from funding divinity school.seathesee wrote: ↑Tue Jun 21, 2022 4:13 pm its an interesting case. i read through most of the majority opinion and dissents.
it seems like based on the espinoza precedent, the outcome for this case was pretty clear. i found this quote from espinoza, cited by roberts, to be particularly compelling:
i found breyers originalists arguments in dissent interesting. he wrote:a state need not subsidize private education, but once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.
his attempts to distinguish espinoza as religious charcter vs. religious use seemed a bit disingenuous to me, particularly since he was not in the majority for that case. trinity lutheran (the other main precedent) seemed distinguishable with that logic, but not espinoza.as thomas jefferson, one of the leading drafters and proponents of [the religion clauses] wrote, "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." [citation]. and as james madison, another drafter and proponent, said, compelled taxpayer sponsorship of religion "is itself a signal of persecution," which "will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with religion, has produced amongst its several sects. [citation]. To interepret the clauses with these concerns in mind may help to further their original purpose of avoiding religious-based division.
As long as the 'play in the joints' line of cases remain abandoned, rather than explicitly overruled, I don't think it's much of a stretch to consider them the more relevant precedent in these types of cases.
if this is what lets state governments escape the establishment clause holdings, it will be the unwritten constitution prevailing over the parts of the constitution that are merely written downsotomayors dissent was refreshing because it was short. i thought she raised one interesting point, which maybe was a bit of a directive as to how to narrowly tailor similar legislation in the future. she wrote:
in addition, while purporting to protect against discrimination of one kind, the court requires maine to fund what many of its citizens believe to be discrimination of other kinds. [citation to breyers dissent] (summarizing bangor christian schools and temple academys policies denying enrollment to students based on gender identity, sexual orientation, and religion).
Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
I mean, isn't that precisely why Sonya Sotomayor is on the court? That the unwritten constitution may prevail over the written constitution?Rylinks wrote: ↑Tue Jun 21, 2022 6:55 pmif this is what lets state governments escape the establishment clause holdings, it will be the unwritten constitution prevailing over the parts of the constitution that are merely written downThe Right Honorable Sonya Sotomator wrote:in addition, while purporting to protect against discrimination of one kind, the court requires maine to fund what many of its citizens believe to be discrimination of other kinds. [citation to breyers dissent] (summarizing bangor christian schools and temple academys policies denying enrollment to students based on gender identity, sexual orientation, and religion).
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do you find the facts of espinoza and carson distinguishable in a relevant way? they seem nearly identical to me, and to the extent carson involved a religious use as opposed to a religious character, i think espinoza did as well.Rylinks wrote: ↑Tue Jun 21, 2022 6:55 pm I view Breyer's opinion as: this is the last refuge of the 'play in the joints' jurisprudence. It's hard to imagine a better set of facts (other than Locke itself) for siding with the state. Espinoza is precedent but the 'play in the joints' is also precedent, and if it doesn't come into play now, then when? The majority breezily distinguishes Locke as relying on a historical state interest, but Locke never held that a historical interest was the outer limit of the state's powers, merely that it was sufficient in that case. When the majority confines Locke to such a narrow set of circumstances, it "effectively abandons this longstanding doctrine". The religious character vs. religious use may be a small step, but it could also be said that the religious education of children is a small step from funding divinity school.
As long as the 'play in the joints' line of cases remain abandoned, rather than explicitly overruled, I don't think it's much of a stretch to consider them the more relevant precedent in these types of cases.
sure. do you think anti-discrimination language would not give the law a chance of overcoming strict scrutiny?
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
yes, for use/character specifically, the maine program focused on the curriculum of the schools, while the program in espinoza did not. The court makes much hay of this in espinoza, and explicitly leaves concerns about curriculum for another day:
I can understand arguments that this is a fine distinction in practice, but i don't think it's foreclosed by the courts precedent.General school aid, the Department stresses, could be used for religious ends by some recipients, particularly schools that believe faith should “permeate” everything they do. Regardless, those considerations were not the Montana Supreme Court’s basis for applying the no-aid provision to exclude religious schools; that hinged solely on religious status. Status-based discrimination remains status based even if one of its goals or effects is preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses.
[...]
None of this is meant to suggest that we agree with the Department, Brief for Respondents 36–40, that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against religious uses of government aid. Some Members of the Court, moreover, have questioned whether there is a meaningful distinction between discrimination based on use or conduct and that based on status. We acknowledge the point but need not examine it here.
Moreover, I think how breyer views the 'play in the joints' jurisprudence is that courts are free to consider a wide range of factors, like how Maine's program is meant to be a substitute for public education in rural areas and the practical effects of a ruling.
In this area, I think a ruling striking down anti-discrimination language would call for strict scrutiny, and a ruling upholding anti-discrimination language would revive the play in the joints language, maybe calling antidiscrimination a "historical interest" to mirror Locke, and not apply strict strutiny at all.sure. do you think anti-discrimination language would not give the law a chance of overcoming strict scrutiny?
Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
sure, but the curriculum requirements werent at issue in the case. the curriculum requirements existed prior to 1981, and a number of students attending religious schools received funding under the program during that period with those curriculum requirements in place. it was the additional requirement added to the program in 1981 that the school be "a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution" that led to the challenge.
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
the way the department interprets that is through looking at the curriculum:seathesee wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 4:29 pmsure, but the curriculum requirements werent at issue in the case. the curriculum requirements existed prior to 1981, and a number of students attending religious schools received funding under the program during that period with those curriculum requirements in place. it was the additional requirement added to the program in 1981 that the school be "a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution" that led to the challenge.
This comes through the federal courts, so i think the supreme court is free to disagree with the department's interpretation here, but this would result in an extremely narrow ruling. Taking the department at its word, maine's assessment of whether a school is sectarian turns the use of the funds--whether they are used to "promote the faith or belief system with which it is associated and/or presents material taught through the lens of this faith"The Department has stated that, in administering this requirement, it “considers a sectarian school to be one that is associated with a particular faith or belief system and which, in addition to teaching academic subjects, promotes the faith or belief system with which it is associated and/or presents the material taught through the lens of this faith.” 979 F. 3d 21, 38 (CA1 2020). “The Department’s focus is on what the school teaches through its curriculum and relatedactivities, and how the material is presented.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). “[A]ffiliation or association with a church or religious institution is one potential indicator of a sectarian school,” but “it is not dispositive.”
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i looked up the montana constitutional clause at issue in espinoza. i see what youre saying. im a bit skeptical of the distinction in practice. i doubt there are many sectarian schools in the country that dont teach through the lens of their faith in one way or another. its hypothetically different, though, and i guess thats all that matters.
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
The Court analyzes all other rights and finds that in cases where the government seeks to abridge citizen rights, it is the government which has the duty to prove that they have the right to abridge the right. It is not the citizen's duty to prove they have a special need to exercise the right, as is the case in "proper cause" license schemes.
The Supreme Court noted that the Courts of Appeals had developed a "two-step process" for supposedly applying the Court's Heller ruling which -- they don't say this explicitly -- was really a way to subvert it.
The two steps consisted of first identifying if the behavior being regulated by law was part of the historical Constitution right to bear arms. If it definitely was, then it couldn't be regulated. If it definitely was not, it could be regulated, and there was no need to proceed to step two. If it was unclear if the behavior being regulated was or was not part of the historic right to bear arms, the courts would then proceed to step two, which was a "means-ends" test which asked if the regulation was a well-constructed means to a noble end.
Courts were incentivized by this scheme to find a lot of constitutionally-protected bearing-arms activities to be located in the "gray zone" where they could then apply their invented "means-end" test, and discover -- surprise! -- that a gun control law did in fact satisfy their test.
The Supreme Court rejects this. A bit snarkily.
The Court also notes that the dissent in Heller argued for an intermediate scrutiny standard -- a means-end test -- which the Court rejected. But which lawless, rebellious Courts of Appeals have backdoored into Heller anyway, effectively making the dissent the ruling opinion.Since Heller and McDonald, the two-step test that Courts of Appeals have developed to assess Second Amendment claims proceeds as follows. At the first step, the government may justify its regulation by "establish[ing] that the challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally understood."
The Courts of Appeals then ascertain the original scope of the right based on its historical meaning. If the government can prove that the regulated conduct falls beyond the Amendment's original scope, "then the
analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unprotected." But if
the historical evidence at this step is "inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected," the courts generally proceed to step two.
At the second step, courts often analyze "how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law's burden on that right." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Courts of Appeals generally maintain "that the core Second Amendment right is limited to self-defense in the home." If a "core" Second Amendment right is burdened, courts apply "strict scrutiny" and ask whether the Government can prove that the law is "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest." Otherwise, they apply intermediate scrutiny and consider whether the Government can show that the regulation is "substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest." Both respondents and the United States largely agree with this consensus, arguing that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate when text and history are unclear in attempting to delineate the scope of the right.
Despite the popularity of this two-step approach, it is one step too many. Step one of the predominant framework is broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment's text, as informed by history.
But Heller and McDonald do not support applying means-end scrutiny in the Second Amendment context. Instead, the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.
...
Moreover, Heller and McDonald expressly rejected the application of any "judge-empowering 'interest-balancing inquiry' that 'asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to
the statute's salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.'"
We declined to engage in means-end scrutiny because "[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government--even the Third Branch of Government--the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon."
We then concluded: "A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all."
This Court now affirms: No, the ruling opinion of Heller is ruling.
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Doug wrote: ↑Thu Jun 23, 2022 5:14 pmThe Court analyzes all other rights and finds that in cases where the government seeks to abridge citizen rights, it is the government which has the duty to prove that they have the right to abridge the right. It is not the citizen's duty to prove they have a special need to exercise the right, as is the case in "proper cause" license schemes.
The Supreme Court noted that the Courts of Appeals had developed a "two-step process" for supposedly applying the Court's Heller ruling which -- they don't say this explicitly -- was really a way to subvert it.
The two steps consisted of first identifying if the behavior being regulated by law was part of the historical Constitution right to bear arms. If it definitely was, then it couldn't be regulated. If it definitely was not, it could be regulated, and there was no need to proceed to step two. If it was unclear if the behavior being regulated was or was not part of the historic right to bear arms, the courts would then proceed to step two, which was a "means-ends" test which asked if the regulation was a well-constructed means to a noble end.
Courts were incentivized by this scheme to find a lot of constitutionally-protected bearing-arms activities to be located in the "gray zone" where they could then apply their invented "means-end" test, and discover -- surprise! -- that a gun control law did in fact satisfy their test.
The Supreme Court rejects this. A bit snarkily.
The Court also notes that the dissent in Heller argued for an intermediate scrutiny standard -- a means-end test -- which the Court rejected. But which lawless, rebellious Courts of Appeals have backdoored into Heller anyway, effectively making the dissent the ruling opinion.Since Heller and McDonald, the two-step test that Courts of Appeals have developed to assess Second Amendment claims proceeds as follows. At the first step, the government may justify its regulation by "establish[ing] that the challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally understood."
The Courts of Appeals then ascertain the original scope of the right based on its historical meaning. If the government can prove that the regulated conduct falls beyond the Amendment's original scope, "then the
analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unprotected." But if
the historical evidence at this step is "inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected," the courts generally proceed to step two.
At the second step, courts often analyze "how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law's burden on that right." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Courts of Appeals generally maintain "that the core Second Amendment right is limited to self-defense in the home." If a "core" Second Amendment right is burdened, courts apply "strict scrutiny" and ask whether the Government can prove that the law is "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest." Otherwise, they apply intermediate scrutiny and consider whether the Government can show that the regulation is "substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest." Both respondents and the United States largely agree with this consensus, arguing that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate when text and history are unclear in attempting to delineate the scope of the right.
Despite the popularity of this two-step approach, it is one step too many. Step one of the predominant framework is broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment's text, as informed by history.
But Heller and McDonald do not support applying means-end scrutiny in the Second Amendment context. Instead, the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.
...
Moreover, Heller and McDonald expressly rejected the application of any "judge-empowering 'interest-balancing inquiry' that 'asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to
the statute's salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.'"
We declined to engage in means-end scrutiny because "[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government--even the Third Branch of Government--the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon."
We then concluded: "A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all."
This Court now affirms: No, the ruling opinion of Heller is ruling.
That's not misogyny or anything.
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
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Held: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.
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Re: POLITICS MOTHERFUCKER
one guess which justice wrote this concurrenceFor that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all
of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell
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Which ones are these
EDIT: I looked them up: contraception; sodomy; same-sex (securities fraud) marriage respectively
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